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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
RESORT CAMPERS, LTD. I et al, ) No. 18262 
) No. 18263 
Defendants ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
ROGER T. RUSSELL, et al, ) 
) 
Defendants and ) 
Appellants ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff conunenced this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that its maximum liability on a motor vehicle dealer's 
bond, issued by plaintiff in accordance with §41-3-16 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as revised and amended, is limited to the sum of 
$20,000. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The district court ruled that the provisions of the 
motor vehicle dealer's bond statute, §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) must be read in connection with the bond to determine the 
nature and extent of the surety's liability. The district court 
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held that the sum of $20,000 is the total limit of the bonding 
company's· liability, regardless of the number of separate claims 
and the total amount of losses claimed during a bond protection 
period. In addition, the court determined that the bonding com-
pany was liable for the sum of $20·,ooo total for each of two 
periods, those periods being October 31, 1978 to October 31, 1979 
and October 31, 1979 to April 12, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests the court to affirm those parts of 
the declaratory judgment of the trial court holding that the bond 
must be read in connection with the statute and that the total 
limit of plaintiff's liability during a bond protection period is 
$20,000 regardless of the number or the amount of claims. On 
cross-appeal, plaintiff seeks to reverse the court's ruling that 
it is liable for the sum of $20,000 for each of the two periods 
in question, or for each period that a premium was paid on the 
bond. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 31, 1978, American Manufacturers Mutual 
Insurance Company issued a $20,000 bond, No. 8SE296415 (Ex. 1), 
on behalf of Dick and Lavonne Noren d/b/a Central RV Sales in 
accordance with §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953) and received 
a $400 premium therefor. On October 31, 1979, the bond was 
renewed by Dick and Lavonne Noren d/b/a Central RV Sales, for 
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which another $400 premium was received. 
All motor vehicle dealerships are required to obtain 
such a bond pursuant to §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Premiums for these type of bonds are set at a $2.00 per $100 rate 
thus requiring a $400 premium for a $20,000 bond. (T. 32) In 
calculating the premium, no consideration is given to the sales 
volume or size of a motor vehicle dealership because it is the 
understanding in the surety industry that a surety's maximum 
liability is $20,000. (T. 51, 63) 
The bond form used in this case was provided to plain-
tiff by the Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration as a 
regular form printed by the State for use by any surety company 
willing to.issue this kind of bond. The form of the bond was 
approved by the Attorney General's Office of the State of Utah,. 
as required by §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953). Any 
deviation from this bond form would have been rejected by the 
Utah Motor Vehicle Business Administration, unless it was 
approved by the Attorney General's Office. (T. 80 I 86) 
It was the understanding of the surety industry as well 
as the Director of the Utah Motor Vehicles Business 
Administration that the total aggregate liability of a surety who 
issues such bonds is $20,000 regardless of the number of 
claimants or the amount of the claims. (T. 63, 71, 83, 99) 
Plaintiff's representative testified that this was also 
plaintiff's intent at the time the bond was issued. ( T. 71) 
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Section 41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953) expressly 
provides that such bonds may be continuous in form. Testimony 
was presented at trial that the bond in question was a single, 
continuous bond and that the $400 premium is considered a per 
annum rate which includes an update of service charge. The 
additional premium is not considered to extend an additional 
$20,000 liability against the surety. (T. 42, 43, 73, 133) 
Numerous claims have been made against the principal, 
Dick Noren, and the plaintiff, alleging that Noren conducted him-
self in such a manner as to give rise to liability on the part of 
the plaintiff and in favor of each of the defendants. 
The amounts claimed by the defendants exceed the $20,000 
face amount of the bond. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS' TOTAL LIABILITY 
ON THE SUBJECT BOND IS $20,000, 
REGARDLESS OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OR AMOUNT 
OF THE CLAIMS. 
Defendants claim that the liability of plaintiff should 
be up to $20,000 per claim. Plaintiff contends, however, that 
its total liability is $20,000 regardless of the number or amount 
of claims made against the bond. 
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A. The Bond and the Underlying Statute Must be Read 
Together. 
The bonding requirement for motor vehicle dealers is 
found in §41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953). The statute now 
states: 
(1) New Motor Vehicle Dealer's and 
Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's Bond: Before 
a new motor vehicle dealer's license or 
used motor vehicle dealer's license is 
issued the applicant shall file with the 
administrator a good and sufficient bond 
in the amount of $20,000 with corporate 
surety thereon, duly licensed to do busi-
ness within the state, approved as to 
form by the attorney general, and con-
ditioned that the applicant will conduct 
business as a dealer without fraud or 
fraudulent representation, and without 
violation of this chapter. The bond may 
be continuous in form, and the total 
aggregate liability on the bond shall be 
limited to the payment of $20,000. 
The statutory requirement for a bond was originally passed by the 
legislature in 1949, and required a bond in "a good and suf-
ficient amount." The statute remained virtually unchanged until 
1977 when the legislature recognized the need for an increase in 
the bond amount. The amount was increased from $5,000 to 
$20,000, but continued to note that "the total aggregate liabi-
lity on the bond shall be limited" to that amount. While the 
statute has received minor changes in style through the years, 
its substantive content has been maintained. 
The applicable language of the bond in question, 
(Ex. 1), states as follows: 
• • • firmly bound to the people of the 
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State of Utah to indemnify any and all 
persons, firms, and corporations for any 
loss suffered by reason of violation of 
the. conditions hereinafter contained in 
the penal sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) lawful money of the United 
States • . • • 
The lower court held in the instant case that the 
foregoing statute must be read in connection with the bond to 
determine the nature and extent of the surety's liability. 
(R. 242) This conclusion follows the general rule that the bond 
and the statute should be read together. In Zele v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 102 Utah 164, 128 P.2d 751 (Utah 1942), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In situations where a bond has been given 
in compliance with some statutory 
provision the provisions of the statute 
are read in connection with the provision 
of the bond to determine the nature and 
extent of the surety's liability. Id. at 
p. 752. 
In the Home Indemnity Co. v. State of Missouri, 78 F.2d 
391 (8th Cir. 1935), cited in the Zele case, the court also 
noted: 
The scope of a surety's obligation under 
such a statutory bond is prescribed by 
the statute in compliance with which it 
is given and by the language employed in 
the bond defining it. Id. at p. 393. 
Hence, by construing the bond language with the statu-
tory requirement, the liability of the plaintiff surety extends 
to "all persons" with a claim, to the "total aggregate" amount of 
$20,000 for all such claims together. 
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B. The Le islature Intended that the Liabilit of the 
Surety was Limited to 20,000 Regardless of the Number or the 
Amount of the Claims. 
The court should note that although portions of the 
statute cited above are permissive in that it provides that the 
bond "may be continuous • • .", the penal sum or total liability 
of the surety is mandatory, in that it provides the "total aggre-
gate liability shall be limited to the payment of $20,000." The 
legislature, therefore, imposed a strict requirement that the 
aggregate liability for this kind of bond be limited to $20,000. 
The term "aggregate" as used in the statute has been 
defined in numerous cases. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 
5th Ed. (1979), "aggregate" means: 
Entire number, sum, mass, or quantity of 
something; total amount, complete whole 
• • • 
In the 1896 case of Chapin v. Willcox, 46 P. 457 (Cal. 
1896), a county government act limited compensation to county 
officers to $7 per diem and 25 cents per mile in traveling, "all 
of which compensation in the aggregate shall not exceed $400 per 
annum." The plaintiff's expenses totaled $487.80, for which he 
made demand. When the amount was rejected, plaintiff brought 
suit alleging the limitation of $400 applied only to the per diem 
compensation, mileage being allowable over this amount. The 
court rejected this notion and noted the following: 
• • • The legislature has declared that 
'all of which compensation in the aggre-
gate shall not exceed $400 per annum each 
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year,• thus leaving little, if any, room 
for construction. It would be difficult 
to express in more explicit language that 
the entire amount which a supervisor in 
this class of counties shall receive in 
the one year for the services required of 
him by law, or by virtue of his office, 
is $400. 
* * * 
If the legislature had merely said, 
'all of which compensation' shall not 
exceed $400 in one year, both the per 
diem and the mileage would have been 
included, since 'all' is a term of 
number, which includes the several items 
making up the basis of the compensation; 
but, as if to make its purpose more 
clear, the legislature has added that all 
this compensation shall not, 'in the 
aggregate,• exceed $400 per annum. The 
term 'aggregate' implies a plurality()'£ 
units, whose total amount it re resents. 
Id. at p. 457. emphasis added 
The decision of In re Miller's Estate, 110 Pa.Super. 
384, 168 A. 807 (1933), gave a similar definition to the term 
aggregate as used in a decedent's will. The will established a 
testamentary fund for the granddaughter and authorized advance 
expenditure of the interest on the fund for emergencies "not 
exceeding in the aggregate $500 yearly." The court held that 
advances were restricted to a total together of $500 and not $500 
per emergency. The court further noted that aggregate was 
defined as, "an assemblage of particulars; a total or gross 
amount; any combined whole considered with reference to its 
constituent part; essentially a sum; considered as a whole; 
collectively." Id. at P· 807. 
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.Anchor Cas. Co. v. Mccaleb, et al., 178 F.2d 322 (5th 
Cir. 1949), was an action for declaratory judgment construing a 
liability policy. A partnership had obtained the policy in rela-
tion to an oil drilling operation. While the policy was in 
force, an oil well blew up with tremendous gas pressure and raged 
out of control for several days. During this time, oil, sand and 
mud were blown into the air and carried onto the properties of 
nearby persons by the wind. The plaintiffs contended that liabi-
lity extended to $5,000 coverage for each accident, and not by 
the limit of $25,000 stated for aggregate damage. The court 
found that the damage to the properties was a separate accident 
to each of the owners and therefore the company's liability was 
$5,000 per person to the extent of the total aggregate liability 
of $25,000. The court found that, "the term aggregate was meant 
to serve as a total limit of damage to property of different per-
sons from a closely related series of events such as were evi-
denced in this case." (emphasis added) Id. at p. 325. 
The cases noted above indicate that the courts view the 
term "aggregate" as meaning the grouping of individual parts to 
arrive at a sum, the total of all parts considered together. In 
essence, the terms "total" and "aggregate" are redundant for 
emphasis. This would indicate that both terms were used in our 
statute to erase any question as to the amount of liability indi-
cated on a dealership bond, i.e., $20,000 total regardless of the 
amount or number of claims. 
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c. Case Law Supports Plaintiff's Position that the 
Total Liability of this Surety is the Penal Sum Specified in the 
Bond. 
There is an abundance of case law throughout the country 
holding that the maximum exposure of a surety, under a surety 
bond required by statute, is the penal sum specified in the bond. 
In an action by the administrator of two different 
estates to recover on the official bond of a peace officer for 
wrongful death of the intestates, the court in Maryland Cas. Co. 
v. Alford, 111 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1940), stated: 
Under the great weight of authority, 
surety's liability is limited by the 
penal sum named in the bond, even though 
different individuals assert claims based 
upon distinct wrongful acts of the prin-
cipal. (numerous cases listed). Id. at 
pp. 390 and 391. 
In Southern Surety Co. v. Bender, 180 N.E. 198 (Ohio 
1931), plaintiff filed an action to enjoin the defendant from 
having an execution issued or taking any other steps to collect a 
certain judgment rendered in her favor in a liability action on 
certain official bonds issued by the plaintiff. Plaintiff had 
. 
earlier paid in judgment to defendant's husband the full amount 
of penalty noted in the bond, and contended no further liabi-
lity. The judgment for the plaintiff and decree for injunction 
against the defendant were granted. Defendant argued that an 
Ohio statute required a different result. The statute referred 
to stated: 
A judgment for one delinquency shall not 
preclude the same or another person from 
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bringing an action on the instrument for 
another delinquency. Id. at p. 200. 
The court, in affirming the trial court, discussed the 
weakness of defendant's argument that the surety remained liable 
after the total penal sum was exhausted: 
The defendant contends that by virtue of 
this language a surety remains liable in 
succeeding suits on a bond, not-
withstanding he may have paid on some 
form or judgment the full amount of the 
penalty named in the bond. This court 
cannot so construe the statute. · It is 
true that the purpose of the enactment 
was to make the surety liable in succes-
sive actions; but the limit of liability 
assumed by the surety in official bonds 
of this character is the penal sum named 
in the bonds. Any other construction 
would result in a great injustice and 
render it practically impossible to 
obtain sureties. 
It is also true that the statute must 
be read into and construed as part of the 
bond, but nothing in the statute or in 
the bond indicates that the surety obli-
gated itself to one party, or to separate 
parties, for any amounts which, in the 
aggregate, exceed the penal sum named in 
the bond. Any different holdings are 
based upon the peculiar phraseology of 
the statute or of the bond. Id. at p. 
200. 
The above-mentioned cases, together with the obvious 
intent of the Utah Legislature that the total aggregate liability 
of the bond shall be $20,000, clearly supports plaintiff's posi-
tion that its total exposure in the instant case is the penal sum 
stated in the bond and in the statute, regardless of the number 
or the amount of the claims. 
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Defendants in their briefs have argued that because the 
bond in question does not use the term "aggregate," that the bond 
could be construed to be broader and provide more coverage than 
the statute. Cases are cited by defendants holding that a bond 
may be executed more broadly than the minimal coverage required 
by statute. In Fountain Green City v. National Surety Corp., 100 
Utah 160, 111 P.2d 155 (Utah 1941), and Bamberg County v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., et al., 173 s.c. 106, 174 S.E. 917 (s.c. 
1934), it is true that the respective courts held that a surety 
could lawfully, by contract, increase the amount of the 
principal's bond by voluntarily executing a bond in a larger sum 
than is required by statute. However, in both these cases, the 
courts extended the surety's liability only up to the actual 
amount which appeared on the face of the bond in question. The 
bond in the instant case was issued to comply with the statute 
and the penal sum is the same in both the bond and the statute. 
The court in Royal Indemn. Co., Inc. v. Special Service 
Supply Co., Inc., 413 P.2d 500 (Nev. 1966), also held that a bond 
may be conditioned more broadly than is required by statute. 
This case is also distinguishable from the instant case in that 
the bond under examination contained language which spoke of 
"defaults" and "material bills" even though it was issued pur-
suant to a statute designed to protect persons from unlawful acts 
of contractors. The court, unable to "discard plain words of a 
valid contract," ruled the language was inclusive enough to 
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encompass simple breaches of contracts. 
See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Housing Authority of 
the City of Miami, 256 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1972), and Peters v. 
Bechdolt, et al., 100 Ind.App. 395, 192 N.E. 116 (Ind. 1934), in 
which the language of the bond specifically extended the coverage 
beyond what was required by statute. 
All of the cases cited by defendants are therefore 
distinguishable since the bond in the instant case does not 
clearly or specifically provide greater or broader coverage than 
the statute. 
D. If the Bond Language is Ambiguous, Extrinsic 
Evidence and Other Relevant Testimony May be Admitted. 
The lower court in the instant case held that the bond 
language was "unclear" as to whether the $20,000 penal sum is a 
per person limit or a per all persons limit (R. 240 - Finding of 
Fact No. 6) 
It is a well-recognized principle of law that if a bond 
or contract language is in any way ambiguous, extrinsic evidence 
and other relevant testimony may be admitted. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated this principle in Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 
570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977): 
To ascertain the meaning of the 
agreements, the court should first 
examine the language of the instruments 
and accord it the weight and effect which 
it may show was intended and if the 
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, then 
consider parol evidence of the parties' 
intentions. Id. at p. 691. 
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Since the bond in the instant case does not specifically 
use the term "aggregate" which is specifically mentioned in the 
statute, extrinsic evidence should be admissible to help the 
court determine whether the bond was nevertheless to apply in the 
"aggregate." 
In Hartford Accid. & Indemn. Co. v. Maus, 260 Or. 203, 
511 P.2d 839 (Or. 1973), the defendant was president of Eugene 
Escrow Service, Inc., a company engaged in the escrow business. 
An Oregon statute required companies engaging in such a business 
to provide a bond. The defendant, Mrs. Maus, secured a bond from 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company after persuading the defen-
dants George and Mary Pile to sign as indemnitors on the applica-
tion to Hartford for said bond. Eugene Escrow Service, Inc. sub-
sequently defaulted and the state was required to make payments 
to persons claiming against the escrow company. The state then 
obtained a judgment against Hartford, as surety, and Hartford 
brought an action for indemnity to satisfy the judgment according 
to the provisions of the indemnity agreement. 
The Hartford bond application with the indemnity 
agreement stated the bond was "to cover real estate license," 
while the bond, when issued, was "bond of escrow agency," and 
therefore contradictory. In considering this problem, the court 
noted: 
Being internally inconsistent, the indern-
ni ty agreement is ambiguous and, there-
fore, extrinsic evidence may be 
introduced to explain the ambiguity. Id. 
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Another case which held that extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to interpret an ambiguous bond or note was Jones v. 
Casstevens, et al., 222 N.C. 411, 23 S.E.2d 303 (N.C. 1942). In 
this case, the plaintiff sold the defendant his one-half interest 
in a jewelry business. The defendant executed his note under 
seal for the amount secured by secured deed or trust on a home. 
The note contained a provision to the effect that if the defen-
dant defaulted, the note could be foreclosed and the property 
sold, but if the sale of the property did not wholly satisfy the 
note, the defendant would not be liable for any deficiency 
judgment. The court held in regard to admission of parol evi-
dence concerning the note: 
• • • It is the holding with us that 
parol evidence is admissible to show an 
agreed mode of payment ·and discharge 
other than that specified in the bond. 
• • • In proper cases it may be shown by 
parol evidence that an obligation was to 
be assumed only upon a certain con-
tingency, or that payment should be made 
out of a particular fund or otherwise 
discharged in a certain way, or that a 
specified creditor should be allowed. 
Id. at pp. 304, 305. 
The court in this case recognized the point of law that 
parol evidence could be shown as long as it did not conflict with 
what had been written. In the instant case, plaintiffs proposed 
extrinsic evidence is offered to clarify any ambiguous language 
in the bond in question, not to contradict what has been written. 
Siata International U.S.A., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of 
North America, 498 F.2d 817 (3rd Cir. 1974), was an action by a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
United States importer of automobiles against a United States 
surety on a bond covering the contracts between importer and an 
Italian manufacturer for a delivery of a specified number of 
automobiles. A question arose in this case, whether or not the 
bond was an advance payment bond or a performance bond. The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted the bond was "a miracle of 
ambiguity" and held that: 
The district court should have received 
evidence to clear up the ambiguity 
instead of attempting to construe the 
instrument on its face. Id. at p. 819. 
Defendants contend in their briefs that the language 
of the bond in question is clear and unambiguous and that extrin-
sic evidence is therefore inadmissible. A careful reading of the 
bond language itself, however, without the helpful aid of the 
statute, may well provide for different interpretations. This 
court has noted before, Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 18 
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (Utah 1966), that where a contract is 
susceptible of different interpretations, extraneous evidence is 
admissible to show intention. 
The cases cited by defendants which have held that 
extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to interpret a 
contract, for the large part, have been cases where the contracts 
examined have had clear and specific language and where extrinsic 
evidence would tend to vary or contradict the terms of the 
contracts in question. That is not the result in the instant 
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case. 
E. The Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration and 
the Surety .Industry as a Whole have Always Understood that the 
Total Liability and Exposure for a Surety Under a Dealer's Bond 
was $20,000 Regardless of the Number or Amount of Claims. 
The extrinsic testimony offered at the trial clearly 
reveals that the understanding within the surety industry itself, 
as well as the understanding applied by the Utah Motor Vehicles 
Business Administration, was that a motor vehicle dealer's bond 
was limited to $20,000 in the aggregate regardless of the number 
or amount of claims. This is highly relevant in determining the 
intent of the parties in using the specific bond language in 
question. 
At the trial of the instant case, plaintiff called as an 
expert witness, Thomas J. Brough, who is the manager of the 
Fidelity & Surety Department of Northwestern National Insurance 
Company of Salt Lake City. Mr. Brough explained that the func-
tion of suretyship was related to a credit function and that the 
financial standing of the principal, or the motor vehicle dealer, 
was critical to the surety. The reason given by Mr. Brough for 
the importance of the financial standing of the principal was 
based upon the surety's evaluation to determine the ability of 
the principal to indemnify the surety should a claim result in a 
payment by the surety. In connection with the surety's eva-
luation of the ability of a principal to indemnify the company, 
Mr. Brough clearly stated that the surety never would consider 
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a need to go after the principal for more than $20,000 in the 
aggregate. Mr. Brough's testimony on page 63 of the transcript 
was as follows: 
Q. And when the company does this, 
does it envision ever going or ever 
having to go over the principal for an 
amount in excess of $20,000? 
(Objections raised) 
* * * 
Q. So then the company would envision 
going after the principals for one 20,000 
loss rather than multiples of twenty? 
A. That's correct. (T. 63, lines 
23-25; 64, lines 10-13) 
Further, Mrs. Dorothy Berthelsen who testified on behalf 
of plaintiff, and who is the manager of an underwriting unit for 
. 
plaintiff, testified as to her understanding of plaintiff's total 
liability on the bond at the time it was issued to the principal. 
Mrs. Berthelsen's testimony was as follows: 
Q. And what would be, based upon 
plaintiff's Exhibit 1, what is the 
understanding of American Manufacturers 
as to the total liability on that bond? 
A. $20,000. 
Q. What if you have ten people who 
each have been defrauded out of $30,000? 
A. It's still the penal sum is 
$20,000. (T. 71, lines 10-16) 
Finally, the Director of the Utah Motor Vehicles 
Business Administration, John A. Burt, testified that the clear 
understanding of the employees in his agency has always been that 
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the total liability of the surety for the bond in question in 
this case is $20,000~ regardless of the number or the amount of 
the individual claims. This testimony is critical to the intent 
of the parties because Mr. Burt in effect represents the 
"obligee" under the bond, or in other words, he is the represen-
tative of the people of the State of Utah who are to receive pro-
tection from the bond. Mr. Burt has been with the agency since 
1953, and was instrumental in persuading the legislature to 
increase the statutory limit of the bond of $5,000 to its present 
day $20,000. (T. 76, 103-104) 
Mr. Burt's testimony with regard to his understanding of 
the surety's liability begins on page 82 of the transcript: 
Q. What is the understanding of your 
department as to the total liability of 
that bond? 
(Objections raised) 
* * * 
Q. Do you recall the question, sir? 
A. Talking about this particular bond? 
Q. Yes. Exhibit 1. 
A. $20,000. 
Q. So whether we have ten claimants 
with $30,000 claims of $30,000 each, the 
total liability of the surety would be 
$20,000? 
A. That's right. 
MR. COOK: Objection to that. He's 
leading the witness. 
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THE COURT: Sustained 
Okay. Based upon what you have told me 
your understanding is and the 
understanding of your department, of the 
total liability of the surety; assuming 
you have ten claimants with each claiming 
a $50,000. What is the total liability 
of the surety? 
A. $20,000. 
Q. Regardless of the number or the 
amount of the claims? 
A. Yes, sir. (T. 82, line 30; 83, 
lines 13-30; 84, lines 1-3) 
The extrinsic evidence presented at the trial clearly 
demonstrates, therefore, the intent of at least two of the 
parties to the bond. Both the surety and the obligee, repre-
sented by the state agency, understood that the bond was limited 
to $20,000 regardless of the total number or the am9unt of 
claims. 
POINT II. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE BOND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE BOND COMPANY AND IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS. 
As previously stated in this brief, the substantive 
language of the bond in question was prepared before 1953. The 
form is provided by the Utah Motor Vehicles Business 
Administration, although it is not clear who actually drafted the 
form. Almost all of the surety companies which issue .bonds in 
Utah use this type of bond form, and they receive it directly 
from the Motor Vehicles Business Administration. The testimony 
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of Thomas J. Brough called as an expert witness by plaintiff, and 
who was employed as the manager of the Fidelity & Surety 
Department of Northwestern National Insurance of Salt Lake City, 
clearly supports this contention: 
Q. Okay. Now going back to say the 
fall or the last six months of 1978; if a 
prospective motor vehicle dealer were to 
come and ask your company to provide a 
bond, where would you get a form? 
A. We would obtain the form from the 
State of Utah and issue it on that form. 
* * * 
Q. Would you explain to the Court what 
you have done to determine what other 
companies are doing concerning these 
bonds of this type? 
A. I've contacted other companies that 
I am familiar with that handle bonds in 
this area. And discussed with them what 
form they use, and on what basis they 
underwrite the bonds. 
Q. Now, as of the present, do you know 
of any company that is using a form other 
than the form that you have before you, 
plaintiff's Exhibit 1? 
A. No. I am not aware of any. 
Q. Do you know what was being done 
back in 1978? Were they all using the 
same form or did they have different 
forms or what was the situation? 
A. The procedure would have been the 
same then, I am sure. (T. 46, lines 3-8; 
47, lines 5-20) 
Further, the testimony at the trial from Mr. John Burt, 
the Director of the Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration, 
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amply demonstrates that any deviation from th~ form provided by 
the State agency would be rejected because it was not approved by 
the attorney general's office. In that regard, Mr. Burt 
testified as follows: 
Q. I guess what you are saying to me is 
that the form of Exhibit 1 that states 
that it has been approved as to form by 
Robert B. Hanson, the Attorney General? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That form would be acceptable to 
you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, if I had someone in my office 
type out the language of this Exhibit 1 
verbatim, that would also be acceptable? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, are you telling me that in the 
event that I reworded any portion of this 
bond it would not be acceptable? 
A. We would not accept it. 
lines 2-14) 
( T. 80 I 
Testimony at the trial further indicates that the prac-
tice of using the State agency form is customarily applied by 
surety companies, inasmuch as the State or the public at large in 
this case is the 11 obligee 11 under the bond. (T. 48, 69) By using 
the bond form that has already been approved by the Attorney 
General, surety companies throughout the state can rely on the 
fact that the form complies with the statutory requirements. 
As a result of all of this, the strict rule of construe-
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tion that normally applies to a party that prepares a written 
instrument should not apply in this case because the plaintiff 
did not prepare the bond in question. If any party should be 
held to this rule of construction, it should be the public at 
large since it was their representative that provided the bond 
containing the disputed language. 
POINT III. 
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE TOTAL 
LIABILITY BE LIMITED TO $20,000 
REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OR AMOUNT OF THE 
CLAIMS. 
If the court were to rule that there is a $20,000 expo-
sure on every claim, bonds would probably be unavailable to motor 
vehicle dealers. Although the court did not permit testimony on 
the public policy ramifications, it is true that if defendants 
were to prevail, the surety companies could simply not afford to 
issue these bond because of the total risk involved. If an 
attempt were made to issue a bond carrying a liability exposure 
of $20,000 per claim, the premium would have to be so high that 
the cost would be prohibited to virtually every motor vehicle 
dealer. As noted in Southern Surety Co., et al. v. Bender, 180 
N.E. 198 (Ohio 1931): 
The limit of liability assumed by the 
surety in official bonds of this 
character is the penal sum named in the 
bonds. Any other construction would 
result in great injustice and render it 
particularly impossible to obtain sure-
ties. (emphasis added) 
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POINT IV. 
THE RENEWAL OF THE BOND BY RESPONDENT DID 
NOT PROVIDE CUMULATIVE LIABILITY OF 
$20,000 PER YEAR. 
The bond in question was originally issued on October 
31, 1978, upon the payment of a $400 premium. The bond was con-
tinued in October of 1979, with the additional payment of another 
$400 premium. The lower court in the instant case ruled that the 
payment of the additional premium provided an additional $20,000 
for claims arising during that second bond period. Plaintiff has 
filed its cross appeal contesting that portion of the court's 
ruling. As previously noted, §41-3-16 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), expressly allows that a bond may be continuous in form 
and that the total aggregate liability on the bond shall be 
limited to the payment of $20,000. 
There are many decisions, in other jurisdictions, where 
it has been held that a bond and subsequent renewals thereof are 
to be construed as a continuing contract which is continued in 
force by the payment of annual premiums, and the renewal does not 
impose additional liability for each bond period. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland, et al., 162 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1947), was a lawsuit 
involving the criminal activities of a Laurence O'Connoll, who 
was bonded in the amount of $20,000 by Fidelity & Deposit Company 
on September 1, 1935, in connection with his activities as chief 
security examiner of the Industrial Commission of Illinois. The 
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bond in question had no expiration date, and there was no 
contractual method for termination by affirmative action of the 
parties, nor was there any express indication of an intent to 
create successive periods of liability. The court noted: 
It is undisputed that the most pertinent 
factors to be considered in the deter-
rnina tion of whether the liability of a 
suretyship bond is cumulative or con-
tinuous are the terms of the bond itself 
and the acts of the parties in con-
templation of the terms of the bond. Id. 
at p. 266. 
The court also took into consideration the receipts or 
invoices for the various annual premiums on the bond and noted 
that in each instance, they refer back to the original bond, spe-
cifying the number thereof and setting forth the amount as being 
the premium due on the various specified dates. The court held 
that the bond was a continuous bond and that the extent of the 
liability of the defendant was $20,000. 
In the instant case, the receipt or invoice for the 
renewal premium referred back to the original bond and number 
(Ex. 4), and plaintiff's premium transmittal memo refers to the 
payment of $400 as an "annual service charge -- continuous bond." 
(Ex. 5) As in Montgomery Ward, the proper interpretation is that 
this bond is a "continuous" bond, which does not provide cumula-
tive liability each year a premium is paid. 
Fourth & First Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Co. of Maryland, 153 Tenn. 176, 281 s.w. 785 (Tenn. 1926), was 
an action involving a blanket bond which was issued by the defen-
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dant to the Fourth & First National Bank by way of protection 
against dishonesty of all the employees of these two banks. The 
bonding contracts between the parties provided for a one-year 
term and subsequent annual premiums. 
The defendant in this case maintained that the bond 
issued to the banks was a continuous bond in the sum of $50,000, 
while the bank contended that the original bond and each renewal 
thereof for the four years the bond was renewed, were distinct 
and separate contracts. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed 
the lower court's decision dismissing the Fourth & First Savings 
Bank's bill against Fidelity & Deposit Company and noted that the 
extent of the defendant's liability was the sum of $50,000 as 
found in the original bond. The court distinguished cases cited 
by plaintiff which have held that certain bonds were not con-
tinuous, noting that the bonds in these cases had covered a 
specific period, the renewal of the bonds did not take place 
automatically, and the bonds were renewed each year only by the 
affirmative action of both parties. 
In the instant case, Dick Noren, the principal, did not 
have to take affirmative action to renew the bonds such as 
filling out a new application. He simply paid the premium after 
receiving an invoice for the same and the bond was renewed. 
Consequently, the instant case is more similar to the facts in 
the Fourth & First Bank case than the cases cited by plaintiff in 
~hat case. 
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John Church Co. v. Aetna Indem. Co. v. John Church Co., 
13 Ga. 826, 80 s.E. 1093 (Ga.), was another action on a bond to 
recover on the liability of the defendant company upon one bond 
for $3,000 and two renewals thereof. The plaintiff in this 
action, alleged that the original bond was made for the purpose 
of indemnifying an amount of $3,000 for one year, and that during 
the next two subsequent renewals of the bond, new contracts were 
made for each year in the amount of $3,000. The renewal receipts 
for the bond were identical except as to date, and as to the par-
ticular term for which the bond would be in force. The language 
employed in these receipts indicated they were receipts for a $30 
renewal premium on a bond for $3,000 and that as a result of a 
$30 premium, the bond was hereby renewed and continued in force 
for the period of one year. The court noted: 
While the renewal certificate might be a 
new contract, it was only a new contract 
as respect to time; that is to say, it 
extended the indemnity provided by the 
old contract to a new period of time 
••• Id. at p. 1096. 
The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the lower court's 
decision that the bond was a continuing contract and held the 
extent of the liability was for $3,000. 
According to 7 A.L.R.2d 946, 947, with regard to 
liability on a fidelity bond renewed from year to year, a 
majority of the cases have held that a bond and the renewal 
thereof are to be construed as a continuing contract, which, in 
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the same manner as a life insurance policy, is continued in force 
by the payment of annual premiums. The annotation further notes 
that the liability of the surety is limited in the bond to a spe-
cified amount, and the surety may not be liable in excess 
thereof, although the acts giving rise to claims may have 
occurred during the different periods of each. 
Again, with respect to the extrinsic testimony offered 
at the trial, it is clear that the understanding in the industry, 
as well as the Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration, is 
that a "continuous" bond provides a total liability of $20,000 
and not an additional $20,000 for every year a premium is paid. 
Both Mr. Robert Blackham, the agent who dealt directly with the 
principal, Mr. Noren, in this case, and Thomas Brough of 
Northwestern National Insurance Company, testified that, in their 
opinion, the bond in the instant case, marked as Exhibit 1, was a 
"continuous bond". (T. 43, 53) Further, Mr. John Burt of the 
Utah Motor Vehicles Business Administration testified as to his 
understanding of how the term "continuous bond" is applied in the 
industry as well as by the State agency: 
Q. Are you familiar with a phrase 
'continuous bond' versus a renewal or am 
I talking Greek to you? 
A. No. Continuous bond, as far as 
we're concerned is one that we get the 
original bond. And the bond runs con-
tinuously. It doesn't have to be renewed 
each year. The bond is of a continuous 
bond. 
Q. Now, if you have say $25,000 and 
say the bond runs from January 1 to 
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December 31st of say '78. And then we 
have a continuous bond into '79 and a 
continuous bond into '80. If you had a 
bond such as Exhibit 1, and you had say 
$30,000 in claims in 1 78, and another 
$30,000 in '79, what is the total 
liability of the surety, based upon the 
understanding of your department? 
A. $20,000. 
Q. Regardless of when the claims 
arise? 
A. Yes, sir. (T. 84, lines 4-19) 
Based on the cases cited above and the extrinsic evi-
dence offered at the trial, plaintiff respectfully requests that 
the court grant its cross appeal and find that the total 
liability of the surety is $20,000 regardless of the amount or 
number of the claims and regardless of the years for which a pre-
mium was paid. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that its total liability 
on the subject bond is $20,000 regardless of the total amount or 
number of claims. The bond and the underlying statute, §41-3-16 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), must be read together. The statute 
clearly sets forth not the minimum but the maximum liability 
required on the bond with its wording that the total aggregate 
liability on the bond shall be limited to the payment of $20,000. 
Since there may be some ambiguity in the bond language 
itself, the trial court was correct in admitting extrinsic evi-
dence and testimony to arrive at the true meaning of the bond. 
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The extrinsic evidence submitted in this case clearly supports 
plaintiff's contention that its total liability is $20,000 
regardless of the number or amount of the claims, or the years 
for which a premium was paid. 
The strict rule of construction that normally applies to 
a party that prepares a written instrument should not apply in 
this case because respondent did not prepare the bond in 
question. 
na ted this :jc day of ), · ly , 1982. 
ST'JNG ·; 
By .. )L 
R. Scott T illiarns 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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